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University of Florida Law Review
VOL. IX

StummE 1956

No. 2

FUTURE INTERESTS IN FLORIDA: A PLEA
FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
J.

ALLEN

SfrrfH and Roy

KEATHLEY*

Several events of the past few years point up the importance of
future interests for lawyers involved with transmitting wealth from
one generation to another. Successful practitioners, together with
teachers, are bringing about a renaissance in the literature of this
historic subject, all stressing its practical as well as theoretical delights.,
It is easy to remember another day when future interests appeared
to lag in importance, urged on primarily by a few law teachers whose
2
attitude has been described by Professor Mechem:
"It is a matter of common knowledge that Future Interests is
not properly a course but an obsession, and that teachers of it
in time develop a complex, akin perhaps to the Jehovah-Complex, which leads them to think that the law school exists for
the sole purpose of teaching Future Interests."
In opposition to this view, but equally extreme, was the attitude of
the practitioners who, along with the courts and Congress, were con0J. Allen Smith, A.B. 1942, Erskine College; LL.B. 1948, University of Florida;
Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
Roy Keathley, A.B. 1954, Vanderbilt University; Student, College of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1E.g., in Florida two future interest articles appeared in the Real Property Law
Symposium, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. (1955): Botts, Removal of Outmoded Restrictions 428;
Sparks, PerpetuitiesProblems of the General Practitioner465. For a helpful policy
approach to future interests, see McDOUGAL and HB.ER, PaOPERTY, WEALTH, LAND
c. 3 (1948). A past president of the American Bar Association, Howard L. Barkdull,
has recently stressed the importance of future interests in an active practice;
see his Foreword to SINIEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955). It is interesting to note the considerable space devoted to the subject by the AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944) gives three
volumes to future interests. Simes and a colleague, Allan F. Smith, have recently
published the second edition of LAW OF FUTruR INTERsrS (1956). Law review
articles are numerous.
-Future Interests Uber Alles, 19 IowA L. REv. 146, 149 (1953).

[1231
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cerned with "practical considerations applicable to taxation and not
'the niceties of the art of conveyancing' "3 - and with reason. The
New Deal sought progressive estate and gift taxes as a measure to
limit the perpetuation of large fortunes, 4 a policy that invaded the
area previously reserved, in large measure, for future interests law.5
It was also apparent that a number of future interests doctrines had
become less important because of the decline of land as the primary
6
source of wealth.
Nevertheless, future interests shows considerable vitality and in
Florida assumes an almost unique importance. As put by Professor
W. Barton Leach, "the attractions of the Miami sands being what
they are for the well-to-do, a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida
may ultimately affect a not inconsiderable fraction of the wealth of
the United States." 7 In view of the fact that the law of future interests
changes, though slowly, the energy of The Florida Bar is needed now
to clarify existing doctrines and practices, to establish reliable model
clauses for conveyances,8 and to support, if necessary, appropriate reform. It is recommended that the bar and the courts make such
future adjustments as may be advisable and that the Legislature limit
its activity in this regard to a minimum.
Tim WAIT-AND-SEE DoCRINE
In seeking to appraise the law of future interests in Florida, it is
convenient to begin with its chief aspect, the Rule Against Perpetuities.9 Relevant opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida are
scanty, consisting of some half-dozen cases. In fact, the rule has been
3Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 114 (1940). Cf.
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 35 U.S. 701 (1949).
4See Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 79 CoNG. REc.
9657 (1935).
5See the excellent collection of authority in McDOUCAL and HABER, PROPERTY,
WEALTH, LAND 324 (1948).

6For a recent discussion of this point see SIMiEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 40-54 (1955).
7Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 721, 780 (1952).
sConsiderable progress is here being made through the work of the Real
Property Section of The Florida Bar. See its collection of forms published in 1955
and 1956.

9E.g., Gray in 1886 called his treatise THE RULE AGAINST PERPE-rrTmS.
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applied to defeat provisions in an instrument in only one instance.10
The Florida Court has stated, however, that it follows the common
law rule: 1
"Under the rule against perpetuities, the vesting of an estate
under a will or deed can be postponed no longer than a life or
lives in being and twenty-one years plus the period of gestation."
2
Although the quotation is the usual generalization of the rule,' its
application has not been fully developed because of the insufficient
number of cases. 13 The Court doubtless relies for its statement of the
rule, at least in part, on the Florida statute14 that adopts the common
and statutory law of England down to July 4, 1776, provided the laws
are of a general rather than a local nature and provided they are
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States
and the acts of the Legislature of Florida. With this statute in mind,
it is clear that the Court's adoption of the common law Rule Against
Perpetuities does not necessarily mean that it accepts its various applications that met with the approval of the courts of England after
1776. An English court, for example, in fee v. Audley' 5 declared that

1OPorter v. Baynard, 158 Fla. 294, 28 So.2d 890 (1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
844 (1947). The Court construed a trust to be essentially private rather than
charitable and destroyed its provisions as not falling within the exception to the
rule provided for charitable gifts. Other cases discussing the Rule Against Perpetuities but not applying it are Adams v. Vidal, 60 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1952); Green
v. Lewis, 113 Fla. 609, 151 So. 270 (1933), aff'd, 113 Fla. 609, 153 So. 901 (1934);
Reimer v. Smith, 105 Fla. 671, 142 So. 603 (1932); Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194,
117 So. 887 (1928); Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925); Cawthon v.
Stearus Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738 (1910).
"Story v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 441, 156 So. 101, 104
(1934); see also Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 201, 117 So. 887, 889 (1928).
(4th ed. 1942). For the best
12GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurrS §201
succinct version of the orthodox view see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51
HARv. L. Rxv. 638 (1938).
-The Florida Supreme Court has not even in broad dicta described the full
reach of the rule. In Van Roy v. Hoover, supra note 11, the Court stated that
any number of lives could count as lives in being; also see Reimer v. Smith, 105
Fla. 671, 142 So. 603 (1932). This failure to circumscribe the rule is understandable, since the development of the common law rule in England took 150
years, commencing with Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931
(1682), and becoming fixed in 1833 in Cadell v. Palmer, I C. & F. 272, 6 Eng. Rep.
956. See LEAcH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INEsrsTS 753-54 (2d
ed. 1940).
14FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1955).
'51 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787).
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a will violated the Rule Against Perpetuities because the law conclusively presumed that a woman seventy years of age could bear a
child. Since the case was not decided until 1787, it would not necessarily be binding in Florida. Other generally accepted decisions construing the English common law Rule Against Perpetuities subsequent to 1776 could also logically be accepted or rejected by the
16
Florida Supreme Court if similar Florida cases were to arise.
The leading case in Florida, Story v. FirstNationalBank and Trust
Co., 27 accepts the common law formulation of the Rule Against Perpetuities but appears to reject its characteristic of requiring absolute
certainty of vesting. The Story case has attained national significance
largely through its citation by Professor Leach of the Harvard Law
School in connection with his Wait-and-See Doctrine,18 which he
urges as a corrective to the requirement of absolute certainty of
vesting. This requirement developed in the English courts primarily
after 1776, probably culminating in Jee v. Audley in 1787 and cases
decided thereafter. Most American courts when confronted with the
requirement of absolute certainty of vesting have felt bound to accept
it, in name at least.19 NWhen applied, it defeats wills or deeds that
provide for contigencies that, judged from the effective date of the
instrument, could cause property to vest later than the permissible
16E.g., Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1805), and
Cadell v. Palmer, 1 C. & F. 272, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), decided the question of
the maximum number of lives and the question of gestation. These decisions,
though generally approved, have never been squarely ruled upon by the Florida
Supreme Court and would not necessarily be binding. But see Story v. First Nat'l
Bank and Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); Van Roy v. Hoover, 96 Fla.
194, 117 So. 887 (1928). Of fundamental importance, but not within the scope
of this discussion, in the absence of clear Florida holdings is the aspect of the
Thellusson case, supra, that denied the existence of a separate rule against accumulations. This holding has evoked considerable discussion, e.g., Gertman
v. Burdick, 123 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1941), in which the Court of Appeals followed
the English common law, unmodified by the English statute. For a development
of the accumulations problem see SIMrS, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND C.
IV (1955). For an extensive treatment of this fundamental principle of Florida
jurisprudence, generally recognized but seldom invoked, see Day, Extent to Which
the English Common Law and Statutes Are in Effect, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 303 (1950).
17115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934).
isHis fullest discussions appear in two similar articles: Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 (1952); Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. Rxv. 35 (1952).
19See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §24.21 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §370k (1944); Simss and SMrrH, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS §§1228-34
(2d ed. 1956).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 1
FUTURE INTERESTS
period of the rule. In regarding only the effective date of the instrument- the death of the testator in case of a will, the date of
delivery in case of a deed -facts as they actually happen are overlooked and gifts are defeated on the basis of what might have happened but in fact did not. As so applied, the rule operates to strike
down carelessly drawn wills, trusts, or deeds that could have been
upheld had the draftsman manipulated a few chosen words.2 0 Professor Leach has advocated that the courts wait and see whether interests vest within the permissible period, defeating only those that
actually vest at a time too remote. He has expressed his recommended
legislation as follows:21
"[Tihe Rule will be applied to any interest on the basis of
events which have actually occurred at the termination of preceding interests, not on the basis of events which might have
occurred but did not."
This proposal is of interest in Florida not only because of the presit but also because of its
tige of its proponent and the logic behind
22
alleged connection with the Story case.
The case concerned the provisions of a will in which the testator
established a trust, providing for his wife, children, and to some extent his grandchildren. The provisions in favor of his children and
grandchildren raised the perpetuities question in two respects:
(1) The testator directed the trustee to pay income from the
trust to his children until the youngest attained the age of
thirty and then to divide and pay over the corpus to the
children. In the event a child died before attaining thirty,
2oLeach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective, supra note 18, at 723. Thus the fact that
an elderly woman might but does not have childrefi voids a gift. Ward v. Van der
Loeff, (1924) A.C. 653. The "unborn widow" is also an example, Loring v. Blake,
98 Mass. 253 (1867).
2lLeach, Perpetuities in Perspective, supra note 18, at 747.
22This case, to quote Mr. Justice Frankfurter in another connection, "shows
the judicial process at its best - comprehensive briefs and powerful arguments on
both sides, followed by long deliberation, resulting in an opinion . . . which at
once gained and has ever since retained recognition as one of the outstanding
opinions in the history of the Court." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59
(concurring opinion). In the Story case Mr. Justice Terrell rendered a unanimous
opinion for a Court that also included Chief Justice Davis and Justices Whitfield,
Ellis, Brown, and Buford.
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his share was to go to his descendants. The trustee was
directed to retain such share until the youngest descendant
reached the age of thirty, paying out income, however, to
care for these beneficiaries.
(2) As to one daughter, Kate Agnes, the testator directed the
trustee to retain her share during her life, paying to her
the income; upon her death to divide her share among her
children when the youngest attained the age of thirty, and
until then to provide for their support and education.
The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor in upholding the will.
Although in several instances Professor Leach has cited the Story
case as authority in opposition to the orthodox requirement of absolute vesting, his clearest statement appeared in 1952 when he wrote
that "the Supreme Court of Florida has given notice that it will not
invalidate interests on the basis of contingencies which never hap23
pened."
To sustain this interpretation urged by Professor Leach, the Story
opinion must be understood to mean that a child of Kate Agnes, unborn at the testator's death, might obtain an interest in the trust only
upon attaining the age of thirty. Since such a construction would
permit the child to take later than lives in being plus twenty-one
years, it would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Under the
orthodox rule, all of the interests of the children of Kate Agnes
would be void. The gift to the children of Kate Agnes is a class gift,
with the result that if the gift to one member of the class fails the gift
fails as to all members of the class.24 Moreover, the entire trust might
23Leach, Perpetuitiesin Perspective, supra note 18, at 73. In 1953, in Reform
of Rule Against Perpetuities, 92 TRusTs & EsrATES 768, 769 (1953), he wrote that
a "dictum in a Florida case" indicated that Florida would accept the wait-and-see
doctrine. In 1938 he wrote that the result in the Story case was "probably opposed
to the rule ... but upon grounds which leave it an open question whether the
cure is not worse than the disease," Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. Rv.
638, 649, n.29 (1938). See also his CAsFS AND MATrERAS ON THE LAW OF FruTu
INTEREsS 868, n.7 (2d ed. 1940).
24Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817). For a discussion
and criticism of this application see Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and
Gifts to Classes, 51 HARV. L. Racy. 1329 (1938). It should be pointed out that
Leake v. Robinson was decided after 1776 and is not binding on the Florida courts.
Even accepting Leake v. Robinson, the Florida Court could have closed the class
comprised of the children of Kate Agnes at the death of the testator by the rule
as set forth in Wheeler v. Fellowes, 52 Conn. 238 (1884), in which a gift to the
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be void.25 The Florida Supreme Court, however, did not invalidate
any provisions of the trust; as a consequence Professor Leach argues
that the Court preferred to "wait and see" if in fact Kate Agnes had
a child who would take too late. There is definite language in the
opinion to support the contention that it is authority for the wait6
and-see position:2
"It would be highly improper to strike a will down because of
a contingency that may never arise, and, if it should arise, it
may do nothing more than accelerate the enjoyment of the
gift."
An additional sentence also indicates that further action might be
forthcoming on facts to appear in the future: "We can see no reason
at present for holding the will of W. L. Story to be in violation of
2
the rule against perpetuities." 7
In opposition to Professor Leach's interpretation, the opinion permits the argument that the language "when the youngest attains
thirty" refers to the time of the enjoyment of the property, not its
vesting. And this rule is supported by the preference of the Florida
Court to construe gifts as vested, subject to postponed enjoyment,
rather than as contingent upon the attainment of a specified age, especially if, as in the Story case, income is to be received by the beneficiary prior to the attainment of the given age. 28 If this were the
youngest upon reaching a certain age was interpreted to mean youngest living
when the instrument took effect, since a different construction would invalidate
the will under the Rule Against Perpetuities. The leading English case, however,
holds that the word "youngest" means the youngest whenever born, Mainwaring
v. Beevor, 8 Hare 44, 68 Eng Rep. 266 (1849). That courts should construe wills
to avoid the application of the rule, see Freund, Three Suggestions Concerning
Future Interests, 33 HARv. L. REv. 526, 535 (1920). That the Florida Court, in
order to save a gift, has construed language to mean definite rather than indefinite
failure of issue, see Adams v. Vidal, 60 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1952).
2IUnder the doctrine of "infectious invalidity," if all provisions in a will are
inseparably bound together all may fail. See SmMEs and SMrrH, LAw oF FuTuRE
INTEREsrs §1262 (2d ed. 1956). In the Story case the plaintiffs alleged a further
violation of the rule not dependent on the time of vesting of the gifts to the
children of Kate Agnes. This additional alleged violation of the rule was based on
the possibility that the children (other than Kate Agnes) would die before attaining thirty, with the result that the gifts over might vest at a time too remote.
26115 Fla. 436, 450, 156 So. 101, 107 (1934).
271d. at 447, 156 So. at 106.
2sCartinhour v. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953); Sorrells v. McNally, 89 Fla.
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correct construction, all interests in the trust deriving from Kate
Agnes would vest no later than at her death; since she was a life
in being, there would be no violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, even under the strictest application. There would remain only
the problem of the duration of the trust, of whether in order to gain
the corpus all children of Kate Agnes must wait until the youngest
attains thirty.
Although the opinion in the Story case gave considerable attention to the problem of the duration of trusts, it is not of compelling
significance in the light of subsequent Florida law. 29 The Court
stated that Florida followed the common law rule, which would mean
that, if the children of Kate Agnes had vested interests, at least at
the time of her death, they could terminate the trust upon attaining
twenty-one rather than upon attaining the age of thirty.30 The
Court stated that the trust provisions of the three children of Kate
Agnes, who were then in being, were valid. A note in the Harvard
Law Review, 31 which supports the position that Florida follows a
wait-and-see doctrine, argues that the gifts to these children must be
contingent on their attaining thirty, since if the gifts were vested the
children could terminate the trust at twenty-one. This argument
overlooks the fact that the Court does not finally rule on the trust
provisions but declares no violation of any rule at the time of the
decision. The Court further suggested that a contingency might "accelerate the enjoyment of the gift," which could be construed to mean
that the Court would permit an earlier termination of the trust than
32
provided for by the instrument.
Since the Story case the wait-and-see doctrine has been given more
457, 105 So. 106 (1925). The general law supports this view; see Phipps v. Ackers,
9 C. & F. 583, 8 Eng. Rep. 539 (1835); Edwards v. Hammond, 3 Lev. 132, 83 Eng.
Rep. 614 (K.B. 1683); cf. Rewis v. Rewis, 79 Fla. 126, 84 So. 93 (1920), in which
gifts were held to be contingent because of survivorship requirements.
29Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947), upheld a spendthrift
trust in seeming contradiction to dicta in the Story case. For a discussion of
the Waterbury case see Note, 2 U. FLA. L. REv. 402, 406 (1949).
30Saunders v. Vautier, 1 Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841).
3lDevelopments in the Law -Future Interests, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1202, 1256 (1935).
32The problem of how long a restraint can last in a trust is not settled, nor
are the courts in accord as to the result that follows when a restraint lasts too long.
See SIMFs and Smrrs, op. cit. supra note 25, §1393, which indicates that a postponed enjoyment clause if it lasts too long is void from its inception. The Story
case, contrary to this view, indicates that restraints that last too long will be accelerated to conform to the permissible period. Cf. Gaess v. Gaess, 132 Conn. 96,
42 A.2d 796 (1945).
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concrete support. Four states have incorporated it into law by statute. 33
New Hampshire has reached the same result by judicial decision.34
As a consequence, the ambiguities of the Story case are of less importance on the national scale but, significantly, will permit the
Florida Court to rule firmly on the matter as the appropriate case
arises; and it is certainly clear that the Florida Court, in the Story
case at least, expressed its abhorrence of a ruthless application of the

Rule Against Perpetuities.
States desiring to enact into legislation the wait-and-see doctrine
have two statutes already in existence to consider. The first to be
enacted was the Pennsylvania statute: 3
33CONN. GEN. STAT. §§2912d, 2913d, 2914d, 2915d, 2916d (Supp. 1955); ME. REv.
c. 160, §§27-33 (Supp. 1955); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 184a, §1 (1955). PA. STAT. ANN.

STAT.

tic. 20, §301.4 (Purdon 1950).
34*ferchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953), noted in 33
B.U.L. Rav. 528 (1953), 53 COLUmn. L. REv. 1158 (1953), 67 HtAv. L. REv. 355 (1953),
52 MICH. L. REv. 305 (1953), 38 MINN. L. Rav. 679 (1954). The testatrix devised
an undivided share of land to her son and daughter for life, remainder to a granddaughter Margaret, to be shared, however, with other after-born grandchildren.
It was provided, moreover, that if Margaret or other grandchildren should die
leaving no issue surviving them the property should go over to testatrix's brothers
and sisters or their representatives. As it happened, the life tenants survived the
testatrix and died, leaving Margaret as the only grandchild, who in turn died
childless. The Court held good the gift over to the brothers and sisters, since it
vested in time, as facts turned out. The New Hampshire court early decided not
to be bound by every aspect of the orthodox rule: in Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H.
434, 31 At. 900 (1891), the court ruled that a gift to grandchildren when the
youngest reached 40 was valid by reducing the age limit to 21. It was not, however, necessary for the court to apply the wait-and-see doctrine in the Merchants
National Bank decision. In similar instances courts have held that when two alternative contingencies exist, one of which will occur within the period, the court
will uphold that contingency. E.g., Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Ireland, 268 Mass. 62, 167 N.E. 261 (1929); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 53 Ky. (14 B.
Mon.) 269 (1853); Proctor v. The Bishop of Bath and Well, 2 Bl. H. 358, 126 Eng.
Rep. 594 (1794); see 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §24.54 (Casner ed. 1952);
SIMES and SMrrn, op. cit. supra note 25, §1257.
35PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.4 (Purdon 1950). Leach approved the Pennsylvania statute in principle but recognized some potential litigation, Perpetuities
Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1349, 1352 (1954). Defending
the statute are Brigy, A Defense of the Pennsylvania Statute on Perpetuities, 23
TEMP. L.Q. 313 (1950); Tudon, Absolute Certainty of Vesting Under the Rule
Against Perpetuities-A Self-Discredited Relic, 34 B.U.L. REv. 129 (1954). In
criticism of the statute are Phipps, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities,
23 TEN,. L.Q. 20 (1949); Polen, Decline and Fall of the Fertile Octogenarian,26
TEMP. L.Q. 148 (1952). Seealso 48 MICH. L. REv. 1158 (1950); 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. 511
(1948); 60 HARV. L. Rv. 1174 (1947); 97 U. PA. L. REv. 263 (1948).
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"Upon the expiration of the period allowed by the common
law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than
possible events any interest not then vested and any interest in
members of a class the membership of which is then subject to
increase shall be void."
The Massachusetts statute,3 6 enacted also in Maine and Connecticut,
requires that facts be determined at the end of life interests; the
wait-and-see period is therefore somewhat shorter than that provided
for in the Pennsylvania statute. Another feature of the Massachusetts
statute is that, if the interest violating the Rule Against Perpetuities
does so because of an age contingency, the age shall be reduced to
37
twenty-one in order to save the gift.
Despite these statutes and the New Hampshire case, Professor
Simes, a leading authority, has strongly opposed the wait-and-see
doctrine. 38 It is his view that the modification would limit the certainty of the rule's application and increase the inalienability of
property. His arguments have been fully developed and deserve attention, but they are probably more telling criticisms of the Pennsylvania statute than of the Massachusetts statute. The best view
for Florida would be to wait and see which direction the Florida Court
takes in the future, profiting meanwhile from the statutory experience of other states. The Story case so nearly approaches the New
Hampshire decision that a statute may be unnecessary if the reform
39
itself is desirable.
POSSIBILITIES OF REvERTER AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY

The leading Florida case considering possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry for condition broken is Richardson v. Holman,40 decided in 1948. Although at strict common law these two interests are
SOMASS. ANN. LAWS c. 184a, §1 (1955). See Note, 39 MAss. L.Q. No. 3, 15 (1954).
37The feature of bringing possibilities of reverter and rights of entry within
a limited period as to duration is discussed in the next section of this article.
38SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE D AD HAND 73 (1955); Simes, Is the Rule Against

PerpetuitiesDoomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. Rv. 179 (1953).
39

0ne point in favor of adopting the rule by judicial decision rather than by
statute is that the latter would probably be deemed to apply only to instruments

drafted subsequent to the date of the legislation. In re Throm's Estate, 378 Pa. 163,
106 A.2d 815 (1954). Cf. FLA. STAT. §689.18 (1955); Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal,
71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954).
40160 Fla. 65, 33 So.2d 641 (1948).
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probably inalienable 4' and are certainly not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 42 prior to the Richardson case the Florida Supreme Court
had not had the occasion to pass upon either of these aspects; nor
had the Legislature directly assumed a position. Academically, the
treatises and casebooks had given, and still give, a separate treatment
to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, explaining their historical development and asserting several differences between the two.
It is generally accepted that the language used to create a possibility
of reverter includes the term "so long as" or an equivalent, that the
grantor creates in the grantee a determinable fee, and that the grantor
holding a possibility of reverter will regain the fee automatically upon
the happening of the condition that brings to a close the determinable
fee in the grantee. 43 It is also traditionally stated that the language
used to create a right of entry includes the term "on condition that"
or an equivalent; that the grantor creates in the grantee a fee simple
rather than a determinable fee; that the grantor holds a right to
demand forfeiture, or to re-enter, or, as put by the Restatement,4 4 the
power to terminate the fee; that the fee does not, upon the happening
of the stated condition, automatically revert to the grantor but
the grantor must declare the forfeiture, and until he does the fee
45
remains in the grantee.
All of this interesting lore has not been specifically incorporated
into the law of Florida, except that the Legislature has in general terms
adopted the common law of England and the Florida Supreme Court
4'Today, however, the possibility of reverter is generally considered alienable.
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.70 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§159 (1944); SIrirs and SirrH, LAW OF FUTuRE INTERESTS §§1860, 1862 (2d ed. 1956).
42S~iMs and SMrrH, op. cit. supra note 41, §§1238-39.
431 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§4.16-.24 (Casner ed. 1952); SiMas and SMITH,
op. cit. supra note 41, §§284-94. This situation arose in a recent North Carolina
case, Charlotte Park and Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d
114 (1955), cert. denied, 76 Sup. Ct. 469 (1956). A deed granting land to a municipal corporation provided that it should be "used and enjoyed by persons of
the white race only," and further provided that upon use by other than white
persons the land should revert to the grantors, their heirs, or assigns. The North
Carolina Supreme Court characterized the restriction not as a covenant but as
creating a determinable fee in the municipal corporation with a possibility of
reverter in the grantor that would automatically arise upon the prohibited use of
the property. E.g., Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), in
which similar language was construed as a covenant.
4RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §24 (1944).
451 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§4.6-.11 (Casner ed. 1952); SIMES and SMrrH,
op. cit. supra note 41, §§241-65.
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has repeatedly asserted that Florida is a common law state. Indeed,
these two interests have been so vaguely recognized that in Sorrells
v. McNally46 the Supreme Court in dictum appeared to link both
the possibility of reverter and the right of entry as two aspects of one
interest denominated as a possibility of reverter.
In Richardson v. Holman the Florida Supreme Court practically
abolished all distinctions between the possibility of reverter and the
right of entry and declared them both to be freely alienable.47 Mr.
Justice Terrell, author of the Story opinion, also wrote the opinion
48
in this case. It reads in part:
"We do not think it essential to the disposition of the question here, to precipitate a discourse in semantics on the difference between a fee simple determinable and estate on condition
subsequent, when a possibility of reverter is or is not alienable,
or when a fee is qualified, what constitutes a naked possibility,
a conditional limitation, or any other uncertain interest in lands.
These old common law concepts had much to do with conveyancing in their day, but even in States like Florida, where the
common law is in effect except as repealed or substituted by
statute, many of them have been obsolete or have been set
aside."
The deed involved in the Richardson case was ambiguously worded.
One Holtsinger conveyed land to a traction company and made the
following reservation:
"Provided, however, and this conveyance is made subject to
and upon the express condition that should [the traction company] cease to use the foregoing land for railroad purposes, then
and in that event the title to said property shall revert to and
rest in the [grantor] and his heirs and assigns."
The foregoing language suggests a right of entry just as much as it
suggests a possibility of reverter; 49 and, although the Supreme Court
finally called it the latter, the language of the opinion suggests that
4689 Fla. 457, 105 So. 106 (1925).
471 U. FLA. L. Rav. 309 (1948).
48160 Fla. 65, 67, 33 So.2d 641, 642 (1948).
49See cases collected in 1 U. FLA. L. Rxv. 309 (1948).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1956], Art. 1
FUTURE INTERESTS
the Court would have reached the same decision irrespective of the
appellation: "Under the Common law a right of action, choses in
action, future or contingent interests, possible and existing estates or
interests, were not assignable, but all of these are now assignable by
statute or in equity."' 0
The Richardson v. Holman decision can be commended for its
refusal to make clear-cut feudal distinctions out of the ambiguous
language in a modern-day deed. More fundamental, the opinion
demonstrates a sophisticated judicial willingness to make adequate
adjustments as particular cases arise. As in the Story case, the Supreme Court in the Richardson case clearly indicated that it did not
wish to become so captivated by the technical apparatus of property
law as to miss the human equation in the decision-making process.
Or, to put it differently, the Supreme Court in these two cases, both
of which give evidence of powerful briefs and advocacy, shows a willingness to reach policy issues and to decide them on a policy-oriented
basis.51
Since the problem of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
vis-a-vis the Rule Against Perpetuities was not invoked in Richardson
v. Holmnan, the Supreme Court properly did not reach it or discuss
it. For many years students of future interests have advocated that
these two interests should be brought within the scope of the rule
or some equivalent, 2 and a number of states by statute have applied
varying limitations to them. 53 Assuming, then, that possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry should not be, as they are at common law,
of unlimited duration, the decision in Richardson v. Holman appears
from a short range point of view to be disadvantageous on two counts:
(1) by declaring these interests alienable, the Supreme Court increases
rather than decreases restrictions on the use of land; (2) the decision
limits the policy behind the Rule Against Perpetuities, which is to
permit the living to manage and control wealth unfettered by un50160 Fla. 65, 71, 33 So.2d 641, 644 (1948).
52For the view that policy decisions can be consciously arrived at with results
superior to 'decisions based on traditional property concepts alone, see Lasswell
and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the
Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943); McDougal, Future Interests Restated:
Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARv. L. Rxv. 1077 (1942).
U2See, e.g., SiMEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND TE DEAD HAND 71 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HAuv. L. Rv.
721, 739 (1952).
r3SIMas
and SmiTH, op. cit. supra note 41, §1994.
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reasonable dead-hand control. Unreasonable dead-hand control is, as
to duration, such control as lasts longer then the period of the rule.
To illustrate:
(1) X deeds Blackacre to B and his heirs but provides that, in
the event the land is ever used for other than farming purposes, the fee shall go over to C and his heirs.
In this example the limitation over to C and his heirs is invalid, since
it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities; the land may not be used
for other than farming purposes until a time later than life or lives
54
in being and twenty-one years.
(2) X deeds Blackacre to B and his heirs so long as the land
is used for farming purposes only. X then deeds his possibility of reverter to C and his heirs.
In example (2) if Blackacre is used for other than farming purposes C
or his heirs receive the fee, even though the prohibited use of the land
takes place later than life or lives in being and twenty-one years. C
and his heirs hold a possibility of reverter, which under Richardson
v. Holman is alienable and which at common law is not subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities. As demonstrated by Professor Sparks,5
it is incongruous to limit the executory interest -the interest of C
and his heirs in example (1) - to the Rule Against Perpetuities and
to exempt the possibility of reverter - the interest of C and his heirs
in example (2) - especially since the latter is now alienable.5 0
This incongruity of Richardson v. Holman may serve as delightful
dialetical fare in a future interest classroom, but it does not shake
the validity of the opinion, unless the assumption is made that the
Supreme Court was not prepared to deal satisfactorily with the perpetuities problem if it arose. Arguments in the Richardson case concerned the question of alienability, not the permissible duration of
the interest. The Supreme Court did not rule on the perpetuities
problem. Had it been pointed out to the Court in the Richardson
54Cf. Brattle Square Church v. Grant, 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1885).
55PerpetuitiesProblems of the General Practitioner,8 U. FLA. L. REv. 465, 476
(1955).
56This point is also developed by SIMFS, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND
70 (1955); see also Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d
922 (1950).
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case, or in a subsequent case, that a possibility of reverter, when
alienable, is in effect an executory interest, the Court might well have
employed its language of not wishing "to precipitate a discourse in
semantics" and have held all of these interests by whatever name
subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.57
Such speculation is moot, however, as a result of Florida legislation. Apparently troubled by the Richardson decision, or else concerned generally with the problem facing a title lawyer who discovers
old and apparently forgotten restrictions in abstracts, the Florida
Legislature enacted a statute 5s that can only be described as unsatisfactory. In the first place, the statute refers to "reverters" and "forfeitures," thereby substituting new language to describe old concepts and making a matter of guesswork just which property interests
are being subjected to legislative change. Presumably referring to
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, the Legislature limited
them in duration to twenty-one years. If the statute was at all necessary, this aspect of it is sound in that it brings the two interests within
a statutory rule against perpetuities that conforms to the common law
rule as to a term in gross.5 9 But even here a peculiar situation can
arise:
(3) If X deeds Blackacre to B and his heirs and provides that
it shall go to C and his heirs if Blackacre is used for farming purposes during specified lives plus twenty-one years,
the restriction on the use of land may last for approximately
100 years, assuming one of the lives in being lives to be
80. The interest in C and his heirs is an executory interest
subject to the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
(4) If X deeds Blackacre to B and his heirs so long as the land
is used for farming purposes, the restriction is good for
only twenty-one years, since the interest remaining in X
is a possibility of reverter subject to the statutory rather
than the common law Rule Against Perpetuities.
57

1n England the Rule Against Perpetuities is applicable to rights of entry. The
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 20, 4(3); In re Hollis' Hospital, [1899]
2 Ch. 540. And by judicial decision an English court held that a possibility of
reverter was within the rule, Hooper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213
(1944).
58FLA. STAT. §689.18 (1955). This statute was first enacted in 1951.
GDCadell v. Palmer, 1 C. & F. 272, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). Massachusetts has
recently adopted a 30-year period; see Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARv. L. Rav. 1349, 1354 (1954).
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Should X in example (4) wish to retain the possibility of receiving
back Blackacre during the common law rather than the statutory
period, he could logically use C as a straw man who would reconvey
to X the executory interest as created in example (4).
The Florida statute, moreover, attempted to make its provisions
retroactive, which led to the case of Biltmore Village, Inc. v. Royal.60
The Supreme Court declared the retroactive provisions unconstitutional,61 with the result that possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry created before 1951, the year of the enactment of the statute,
can last forever unrestrained by any rule against perpetuities, common
law or statutory. Yet the same interests created after the statute last
for twenty-one years only.
Again, however, there is no indication that the Supreme Court
was urged to apply the Rule Against Perpetuities to possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry. The Court would not have been harder
put to bring these two interest at least within the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities than it was to eliminate the determinable fee from
the hierarchy of estates in, land, a holding implicit in Richardson v.
Holman. Indeed, the matter may not be completely foreclosed, since
nowhere in the Biltmore Village decision does the Court rule as to
whether the two interests are of unlimited duration; the holding of
the case is that the interests in existence prior to the statute are not
affected by the terms of the statute, that to rule otherwise would be
to impair the obligation of the original contract establishing the restriction.
In no case has the Supreme Court clearly asserted that possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry are not subject to the common law
Rule Against Perpetuities, though it must be reluctantly admitted that
the cases so imply. If such is the case, as one lecturer put it, "This
decision destroys any chances of voiding [such] restrictions in deeds
now in existence." 62 Whether this unfortunate conclusion to the
auspicious beginning of Richardson v. Holman would have occured
if the Legislature had permitted the judiciary to work out these matters over a period of time, with the aid of cases prepared by the leading
conveyancers of the state and argued by the leading appellate lawyers,
will never be known.
6071 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954). See Boyer, Survey of Real Property Law, 10 MAmI
L.Q. 389 (1956); 9 MiAMi L.Q. 232 (1955); 7 U. FLA. L. Rav. 340 (1954).
GiSee Stephenson, Constitutional Inviolability of Possibilities of Reverter and
Rights of Entry in Florida, 6 MIAMI L.Q. 162 (1952).
62Botts, Removal of Outmoded Restrictions, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 428, 443 (1955).
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THE PROBLEM OF THE COVENANT

Accepting Richardson v. Holman and the subsequent statutory and
case law as substantially fixing the law pertaining to possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry for condition broken, the problem of the
covenant still remains. The problem in its larger aspect has been most
ably dealt with by the Supreme Court, and unless that situation
changes it is urged that the Legislature refrain from passing statutes
on the subject. The two leading cases in Florida on the covenant
that runs with the land are Osius v. Barton,63 decided in 1933, and
Barton v. Moline Properties,4decided in 1935.
In Osius v. Barton, litigants relying on restrictive covenants in a
deed asked the courts to enjoin owners of property from conducting
a beauty parlor 'on a lot in Miami Beach that had been developed
and sold expressly for residential purposes. The language of the
deeds involved clearly described the restriction on the use of the
property as a covenant. The Florida Supreme Court masterfully laid
down the following doctrine as to covenants:, 5
"It seems to have been uniformly held that where the equitable enforcement of building restrictions would be oppressive
and unreasonable because of an entire change in the circumstances and in the neighborhood of the property, and the character of the improvements and the purposes to which they are
applied, equity may refuse to enforce observance of the restrictions, and leave the parties to their action at law ....
And it
has also been held that a change in the character of the neighborhood may be so radical, or there may be such a course of
conduct by the interested parties in mutually disregarding the
restrictions, that such restrictions may cease to have any further
life and thereby become subject to being removed as clouds
on the title."
In Barton v. Moline Properties the petitioners, relying on the
Osius case, sought to have a restriction on the use of land removed as
a cloud on title. Although the Supreme Court was not unanimous, it
affirmed the circuit court in removing the cloud. In addition, the
63109 Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (1933).
64121 Fla. 683, 164 So. 551 (1935).
0a5109 Fla. 556, 563, 147 So. 862, 865 (1933).
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Court modified some of the language used in the Osius case to provide that, if the restrictions are still of substantial benefit to the
dominant lot, a court of equity will restrain their violation, notwithstanding the changed conditions of the neighborhood. 66
The American Law of Property cites the Barton case as its only
clear authority that such covenants can be removed as clouds on title,
eliminating the action for damages as well as injunctive relief.67 Judge
Clark has approved the Osius decision,68 which in fact cited the first
edition of his book. The two cases are clearly in line with Dean
Pound's earlier recommendations.69 In short, these two cases indicate
the judicial process at its best. They are far-reaching decisions, as
are Story v. First National Bank and Richardson v. Holman. The
Legislature has not yet diminished the influence of the Story case or
these covenant cases, as was done with the Richardson case. The Barton case, however, does suggest an area of confusion that can only be
clarified by the conveyancers and the courts. The restriction in the
Barton case was dealt with, as in the Osius case, as a covenant. It
70
reads in part:
"Violation in whole or in part ... shall cause the ...real
estate to immediately revert to the grantor, its successors or
assigns, and shall entitle the grantor, its successors or assigns,
to immediately enter upon said property without notice, and
take possession of the same, with full title in fee simple, together with all improvements thereon."
The italicized language shows verbiage that could describe either
a possibility of reverter or a right of entry. Yet it was treated by the
Court as a covenant. Covenants are not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 71 but in view of the Osius and Barton decisions restrictive covenants can be eliminated as conditions require. On the other
hand, they can last indefinitely. The possibility of reverter and right
66For the view that the governing principle is still that established in Osius v.
Barton see Botts, supra note 62, at 437.
672 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §9.22, n.7 (Casner ed. 1952).
6SCLAmK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTEREsTs WHICH "RUN VinI- LAND" 175,
186 (2d ed. 1947).
soPound, The Progress of the Law, 33 HARV. L. REv. 813, 820 (1920).
70121 Fla. 683, 687, 164 So. 551, 553 (1935). Emphasis supplied.
71CLARK, op. cit. supra note 68, at 159; Sius and SMIrH, op. cit. supra note
41, §1246.
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of entry that once could last forever and that could not be removed as
a cloud on title are now, at least since 1951, subject to a duration of
twenty-one years. Since the Court in the Barton case described what
looked like a possibility of reverter or a right of entry as a covenant,
it might with equal logic describe a covenant as a possibility of reverter or right of entry. In other words, the description given by the
Courts to the interest involved makes for a considerable difference in
result. The problem is frequent, since deeds are often ambiguous, em2
ploying language identifiable with several interests.7
ESTATES TAIL AND THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE

The Florida Legislature has abolished estates in tail 73 and the
Rule in Shelley's Case.7 4 There is little doubt that their elimination
from the body of active future interests law accords with modern notions of the transmission of property; 75 but the question remains
whether the particular statutes are the best that could have been
devised, or even whether these changes could not better have been
made by the process of judicial decision. Professor James W. Day
has exhaustively examined and analyzed the several pertinent statutes
in Florida and has found that they raise a number of questions that
could lead to litigation as a result of piecemeal legislation and inconsistent language.76 For example, one of the statutes creates re72The dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Patterson in Biltmore Village, Inc.

v. Royal, 71 So.2d 727, 729 (Fla. 1954), indicates that the combination of restrictive
covenants and reverter provisions in a single deed has been common in Florida
since the twenties. It is submitted that a grantor actually receives less protection
rather than more by employing the two devices at the same time, since the court,
in effect, can choose which provision to enforce. Associate Justice Patterson dearly
stated the orthodox position as follows: "Reverter provisions are not necessary
to the enforcement of restrictive covenants, and indeed, in legal contemplation
at least, are not instruments of enforcement, but are limitations on the estate
conveyed." Ibid. But if Richardson v. Holman did away with distinctions between
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, in effect eliminating the determinable
fee, it would have been logical to treat these interests as covenants or as executory
interests.
73FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1955).
74FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1955).
7sAs to estate tails see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY c. 5, Introductory Note, Special

Notes 4-6 (1944). As to Shelley's Case see id. §813.
76Unfortunately Professor Day's studies in this regard are in mimeographed form
only, Introduction to the Law of Real Property, especially pp. 77-94 (College of
Law, U. of Fla.).
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mainders in being at the time of the commencement of the preceding
life estate;77 another statute creates remainders in persons in being
at the time of the death of the life holder.78 Furthermore, these two
statutes are related to the extent that they both refer to the estate
tail. Instruments, then, purporting to create an estate tail would
necessitate a different result depending on the particular statute in
effect at the time of the deed3 9
The foregoing may be of more than theoretical interest. In 1952,
in National Turpentine 6- Pulpwood Corp. v. Mills,0 the Court applied the Rule in Shelley's Case to give a plaintiff an estate in fee
simple despite language in a deed conveying to the plaintiff a life
estate and providing that at his death title would go to "his heirs in
fee simple, share and share alike." The Court found it necessary to
apply the Rule in Shelley's Case, since its abolition by the Legislature
occured after the date of the deed. Despite the interest-defeating
result of the National Turpentine case, the Court has indicated a
willingness to construe language that might suggest an indefinite
failure of issue as nevertheless indicating definite failure of issue, with
the result of avoiding the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 81 There is no reason to assume that the Court would reject a construction to avoid a harsh application of the Rule in Shelley's Case,
either as required at common law or by Florida statutes in lieu thereof.
No additional legislative action appears necessary at this time.
THE DESTRUCTIBILITY OF CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
There is one problem in future interests law that needs legislative action. In four cases 82 the Florida Supreme Court has recognized
77FLA. STAT. §689.17 (1955).
78FLA. STAT. §689.14 (1955).

79It would be possible to have a contingent interest under one statute, a vested
interest under the other. Shelley's Case involves both fee simples and fee tails;
its abolition by statute limited, to a degree, the application of the older statute
abolishing fee tails. That the Court might not be able to declare both remainder
interests vested, see Rewis v. Rewis, 79 Fla. 126, 84 So. 93 (1920); Paul v. Frierson,
21 Fla. 529 (1885). As to the contingent-vested dichotomy see Smith, Destructibility
of Contingent Remainders in Florida, 3 U. FLA. L. Rav. 319, 302, n.6 (1952).
8o57 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1952). For a discussion of this case, including the older
Florida holdings, see 6 U. FLA. L. Rlv. 578 (1953).
81Adams v. Vidal, 60 So.2d 545 (Fla. 1952).
S2 Popp v. Bond, 158 Fla. 185, 28 So.2d 259 (1946); Lewis v. Orlando, 145 Fla.
285, 199 So. 49 (1940); Tankersley v. Davis, 128 Fla. 507, 175 So. 501 (1937); Blocker
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the doctrine of the destructibility of contingent remainders. 83 This
doctrine, though of rather limited scope, defeats the intent of the
testator or grantor without supporting any recognizable social policy.
Its impact can be avoided by careful draftsmanship, or advocacy, buf
the Court has indicated that it will apply the doctrine if necessary.
At the same time the Court has practically invited the Legislature
to effect a change. 4 The Uniform Property Act suggests the following
statute:s 5
"No future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall be
destroyed by the mere termination, in any manner, of any
or all preceding interests before the happening of the contingency to which the future interest is subject."
CONCLUSION

A cursory survey of the major future interests problems in Florida
indicates that, with the exception of the doctrine of the destructibility
of contingent remainders, the Florida Supreme Court has brought to
their solution a sophisticated judicial approach. The Legislature,
when it has acted, has generally acted too soon and without complete
clarity of expression. At present Florida remains unshackled by any
unfortunate body of case law and incompetent statutes such as en87
6
cumber other jurisdictions, including Michigan and New York.
So far the problems are few, and the rest is silence. There is every
reason to hope, however, that any large number of future cases that
may arise as a result of population growth and other factors within
the state s can well be decided by the courts of Florida. They should
v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931).
83For a discussion of this doctrine and arguments leading toward legislative
reform see Smith, supra note 79, at 319; see also 15 FLA. LJ. 334 (1941).
s 4See Popp v. Bond, 158 Fla. 185, 28 So.2d 259 (1946).
859A U.LA. 254 (1942).
86
1n 1846 Michigan copied a number of New York statutes; see generally
(1954). In 1949 Michigan res
FRATCHER, PERPE urrms AND OTHm REsmm
asserted certain principles of the common law, MiCH. STAT. ANN. §26.49 (Supp.
1955).
87For a discussion of the New York legislation see SMEs and SMrrH, supra note
41, §§1415-25.
58The concern of the state to ease the tax burden of the wealthy has been
generally recognized since Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
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certainly have the first opportunity to set the legal framework in this
important area. 9 There is no need, at this time, for major legislative change.

SgThe question is really who can best make adequate policy decisions. Simes
in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 71 (1955) says in speaking of the Rule
Against Perpetuities: "It is, I think, obvious that nothing short of legislative action
can adapt the Rule to the requirements of modern society. The limitations of
judicial action prevent adequate reform by judicial decision." In Florida, however,
there is little to reform, and the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to bring
property doctrine in line with reality. Yet Simes criticizes legislative attempts to
create a new Rule Against Perpetuities; his desire is for "amendments," id. at 72.
But the Rule Against Perpetuities in Florida is essentially the Story case. What
is there to amend? Although Leach now wishes statutory changes, he earlier wrote
to the effect that the Rule Against Perpetuities had developed "in the finest tradition of the English common law." CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS
736 (2d ed. 1940). The most telling criticism of legislative action, absent a thoroughgoing policy re-evaluation, is from McDougal, supra note 51, at 1115. Speaking
of the law of powers, Professor McDougal wrote: "How . . . can legislators, if
judges be too humble, place 'the doctrine of powers on rational grounds,' and
bring them into 'harmony with the general system of our laws' and adapt them
'to the state of our society' and to the 'policy of our institutions'?" Although both
Professors Simes and Leach advocate legislative change, they are not in agreement
as to what statutes legislatures should pass. See SIAEs, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 72 (1956) and review of the book by Leach and Morris, 54 MICH. L. REV.

580 (1956).
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